The terrain of private-land conservation dealmaking is shifting. As the number of acres 18 of private land protected for conservation increases, our understanding of what it means for a 19 property to be "conserved" is shifting. We examined 269 conservation easements and conducted 20 73 interviews with land conservation organizations to investigate changes in private-land 21 conservation in the United States. We hypothesized that since 2000, conservation easements 22 have become more complex but less restrictive. Our analysis reveals shifts in what it means for 23 private land to be "conserved." We found that conservation easements have indeed become more 24 complex, with more purposes and terms after 2000 compared to conservation easements 25 recorded before 2000. However, changes in restrictiveness of conservation easements varied by 26 land use. Mining and waste dumping were less likely to be allowed after 2000, but new 27  Conservation easement deeds are more complex with more complicated land use terms 35  Increased conservation on working land alters the private conservation landscape 36  Using partial-property tools for private land conservation is limited 37
residences and structures were twice as likely to be allowed. We found a shift toward allowing 28 some bounded timber harvest and grazing, and a decline in terms that entirely allow or prohibit 29 these working land uses. Interviews revealed staff perceptions of reasons for these changes. Our 30 analysis suggests that "used" landscapes are increasingly important for conservation but that 31 conserving these properties stretches the limits of simple, perpetual policy tools and requires 32 increasingly complex and contingent agreements. 33
Highlights: 34 INTRODUCTION 48
Land conservation can prevent development and enhance environmental management and 49 recreation. Conservation easements are part of the global trend toward decentralized 50 environmental governance in which nonprofit and government entities negotiate standards and 51 enforce rules (Owley, 2013) . Internationally, public agencies and nonprofit organizations have 52 sought ways to augment land protection and are increasingly relying on conservation easements 53 (CEs). As CEs become increasingly important for land conservation, it is helpful to understand 54 how the tool is evolving (Merenlender et al., 2004) . Since they are perpetual restrictions on land 55 based on today's understanding and preferences, CEs tend to remain fixed once established with 56 subsequent transactions reflecting organizational learning and changing conservation contexts 57 (Rissman, 2011) . Organizations and landowners are learning from experience and responding to 58 changing institutional contexts for conservation, so CEs established in the 1980s and 1990s may 59 be substantially different from those of more recent decades. 60
We examined 269 conservation easements from six U.S. states to investigate differences 61 between older and more recent CEs and conducted 73 interviews with staff of organizations 62 holding these CEs. The CE and interview data present a compelling story of change within 63 private-land conservation. Scholars and practitioners have noted increasing sophistication of CEs 64 (Boyd et al., 1999 ). Yet, the trends and contours of these changes have not been examined 65 systemically. Understanding how CEs are changing provides important information to land 66 conservation stakeholders considering how to conserve land. 67
Conservation Easements 68
CEs are nonpossessory rights in land with a conservation purpose. The holder of a CE is a 69 government agency, nonprofit land trust, or Native American tribe with a nonpossessory right in 70 another person or entity's real property. Such rights are generally negative, prohibiting the 71 landowner from doing something she would have otherwise been able to do. CEs can also 72 contain affirmative rights, giving the CE holder the right to do something the landowner could 73 have otherwise prohibited. Whether negative or affirmative, the goal of the restriction is to yield 74 a conservation benefit (NCCUSL, 2007) . CEs vary widely in purposes, restrictions, and the size 75 and landscape context of conserved properties. Common examples of CE terms include 76 prohibitions on development, limitations on activities in wetlands, and rules regarding forestry 77 and agricultural practices. 78
The CE tool has evolved significantly. Historically, courts did not approve of CEs, 79 disfavoring long-term restrictions on land that made transfers and negotiations regarding land 80 uses more cumbersome. Conservationists grew dissatisfied with the limitations of public land 81 conservation and land-use regulation and began to look for additional mechanisms to protect 82 environmental amenities (Owley, 2006) . CEs appeared a logical outgrowth of traditional 83 property agreements like easements and real covenants that restrict a landowner's behavior on 84 her own land or permit a right holder to do something on the land (like trespassing) that the 85 landowner would otherwise have been able to prohibit. CEs needed new legal foundations due to 86 inherent legal conflicts with traditional real estate mechanisms (that limited permissible holders 87 and purposes of servitudes) and the desires of conservationists (Cheever, 1996) . Therefore, 88 beginning in earnest in the 1970s and increasing after a 1981 Uniform Act, U.S. states enacted 89 CE statutes validating the use of such agreements and creating foundations for their enforcement. 90 The growth in CEs in the U.S. has been driven by the growth of the land trust movement and 98 the infusion of public funding from ballot initiatives and the U.S. Farm Bill. The number of land 99 trusts has grown at an incredible rate. In 1950, there were only 53 land trusts, and in 2011 there 100 were over 1,700 (McLaughlin, 2004) . The 2010 Land Trust Alliance's Census tallied the total 101 hectares of CEs held by land trusts at over 19 million (Chang, 2011 We expected to find that CEs increased in complexity, with newer CEs including more 120 purposes and terms. Contract theory, diffusion of innovation, and organizational learning suggest 121 an increase in complexity over time (Argyres et al., 2007; Gray, 1973; Vanneste and Puranam, 122 2008) . CEs evolved in conjunction with changes in state and federal law, funder requirements, 123 and increased public scrutiny. As land trusts and government agencies mature and CE use 124 increases, holders are more likely to be repeat participants. With this experience and the growth 125 in the number of attorneys working with CEs, we expect organizations to anticipate more 126 potentialities and negotiate for more terms, seeking to maximize the likelihood of achieving their 127 conservation goals. We also expect that donated CEs might be less complex than purchased or 128 partially-purchased CEs (Rissman, 2010) . CEs are also more likely to be part of mitigation for 129 development or other habitat destruction in which the expectation for defined rules and duties is 130 higher (Owley, 2011) . Larger properties may also require greater complexity in CE terms. 131
An increase in complexity of conservation easements would be consistent with trends seen in 132 other types of contractual documents. Attorneys often seek to improve contract completeness by 133 adding contingency planning or by increasing contract details (Argyres et al., 2007) (Crocker and 134 Reynolds, 1993) . As parties to contracts learn about potential outcomes through personal 135 experience, court cases, and news reports, they add contract language regarding such events. 136
Though characterized as deed restrictions, CEs are similar to contracts, are often referred to as 137 contracts (Tegene et al., 1999) , and courts use contract rules when interpreting them (Haines, 138 2012) . 139
Innovative terms may also have diffused through conservation organizations. Diffusion of 140 innovation occurs where there is "communication of a new idea in a social system over time" 141 (Gray, 1973) . Increased levels of interaction though social media likely magnify this effect. For 142 example, increased use of model CEs, publications like the Conservation Easement Handbook or 143 the Land Trust Alliance's Standards and Practices, or discussions on the Land Trust Alliance 144 listservs enable drafters to easily adopt terms and techniques used by others. It is also possible 145 that there is a bandwagon effect (Asch, 1955) for CE terms. That is, the probability of any holder 146 adopting a particular term increases with the proportion of holders who has already done so 147 (Colman, 2012) . 148
Organizational learning theory supports the hypothesis of increasing complexity. 149
Organizational learning is a change in an organization's practices based on experience (Argote, 150 2013). As land trusts enter into more conservation easements, staff members change and improve 151 their conservation easements based on their earlier transactions and in reaction to conflicts that 152 have arisen with landowners. Repeated interactions enable drafters to capture more 153 contingencies. Changes are more frequently driven by actual experiences rather than increased 154 ability to predict potential future occurrences (Mayer and Argyres, 2004) . It is impossible to 155 foresee all contingencies, and staff identify important terms that were left out of prior CEs. For 156 example, if land trusts have problems with landowners dumping trash, they are likely to add 157 provisions on waste dumping to future CEs. Incorporating new CE terms guards against 158 organizational forgetting and may leave terms in subsequent CEs long after individual staff 159 members have forgotten why the terms first appeared (Argote, 1999) . 160 1.3. Hypothesis 2: Conservation easements have decreased in restrictiveness. 161
While CE documents may become increasingly complex, the restrictions on landowners may 162 be lessening. 1 We hypothesized that recent CEs would allow landowners to exercise more land-163 use rights for a few reasons. The earliest CEs preserved key landmarks or were viewed as 164 "forever wild" CEs that did not allow substantial use or development of those properties (Jacobs, 165 2014) . CEs are now used in more contexts and on larger properties. They may be more likely to 166 be part of a large-scale suburban development, in urban areas, or on a golf course. To attract new 167 landowners and enable a growing conservation land base, CEs may also increasingly encumber 168 residential properties or large working lands with active farming, grazing, and timber harvesting. 169
In these cases, landowners typically retain rights to conduct activities on the lands. Changes in 170 funding and conservation organization priorities could also contribute to decreased restrictions 171 on land use. One trend that may run counter to this hypothesis is that donated CEs may contain 172 fewer restrictions than purchased or other CEs, since landowners typically receive less financial 173 incentive for a donated CE. Purchased CEs have increased with funding from the Farm Bill and 174 voter-approved bond initiatives. 175
METHODS 176
We examined 269 CEs from six states in the U.S. (California, Colorado, Indiana, New York, 177
South Carolina, and Wisconsin). We collected the CEs through a distributed graduate seminar 178 conducted among six universities in Spring 2011 (Ref Redacted). To include a wide range of 179 land conservation organizations and CEs, we selected 63 land trusts and governmental holders 180 from 28 regions across the six states. We then acquired four CEs from each organization: the 181 oldest and newest CEs, a middle CE from the median year between the oldest and newest CE, 182 and the largest CE (by area) held by the organization in the study region. If the largest CE was 183 also the oldest, middle, or newest, the second largest CE was selected. We selected these CEs to 184 maximize the variation in terms within each organization. 185
We coded the CEs by categorizing their purposes, land-use terms, and procedural terms. To test our first hypothesis of an increase in complexity, we first examined whether the number 199 of purposes was higher after 2000 by conducting a multiple linear regression (all analyses in IBM 200 SPSS v.22) of the number of purposes in each CE with independent variables year (before or after 201 2000), property size (larger or smaller than 500 acres), and whether the CE was donated (yes/no), 202 and a size*year interaction term. The size*year interaction term was not significant, so it was 203 removed from the final model. We conducted chi-squared analyses of whether specific purpose 204 clauses and types of purposes were more or less common after 2000. 205
Second, we tracked the presence of 17 land-use and 5 procedural CE terms. We developed this 206 list of provisions based on the Land Trust Alliance's Conservation Easement Handbook and our 207 previous experience with CEs. We created a land use complexity metric that summed the number 208 of land uses that each CE mentioned (including provisions to restrict or permit the land use), out 209 of 17 land use categories. We hypothesized that CEs after 2000 would mention more land uses 210 than CEs before 2000, which we tested with the nonparametric Mann-Whitney U test. We used 211 the nonparametric test here because the complexity metric sums many diverse types of easement 212 terms. We tested change in presence of five procedural terms (termination, condemnation, Acts of 213 God, amendment, dispute resolution) before and after 2000 with chi-squared analysis. 214
Our second hypothesis considered whether later CEs are less likely to restrict landowners' 215 private land uses. When examining CE terms to test this hypothesis, we looked for both the 216 presence of terms and their meaning. For example, instead of just asking whether the CE had a 217 term about invasive species, we examined what that term said and what level of control the CE 218 purported to exert over landowner action. We examined whether CEs became more restrictive 219 through chi-squared analysis of land-use restrictions. 220
We compared development terms in CEs before and after 2000 with multinomial logistic 221 regression (n=269), controlling for property size, working land purpose (including forestry, 222 grazing, or agriculture), and whether the CE was donated. Development restrictions were divided 223 into three categories: no new development; one residence, agricultural building, cabins, or other 224 structures; and two or more new residences allowed. The final model regressed development terms 225 with year (before or after 2000), size of property (smaller or larger than 500 acres), and whether 226 the CE included a working land purpose. We initially included a year*size interaction term and 227 whether the CE was donated, but these variables were not significant and were removed from the 228 final model to minimize AIC. 229
We also developed multinomial logistic regressions to examine whether timber harvest 230 grazing terms were more or less restrictive after 2000. We classified the dominant land cover of 231 each CE based on GIS maps, Google Earth, and document descriptions. We examined harvest 232 terms on forested CEs (126) and grazing terms on grass/shrub CEs (108). Properties with a 233 dominant land cover of wetland (31) or other (4) were excluded. For forest properties, we 234 examined whether CE terms allowed any timber harvest, some timber harvest (with restrictions 235 in the CE or an associated management plan), or no timber harvest were more or less common 236 after 2000, controlling for property size, working land purpose, and whether the CE was donated 237 (n=126). Property size, a size*year interaction term, and donated were not significant and were 238 removed from the final model due to selection to minimize AIC. For grass/shrub properties, we 239 examined whether CE terms that allowed any grazing, some grazing (with restrictions in the CE 240 or an associated management plan), or no grazing were more or less common after 2000, 241 controlling for property size, working land purpose, and whether the CE was donated (n=108). A 242 size*year interaction term and donated were included in the preliminary grazing terms model but 243
were removed because they were not significant and removing them minimized AIC. 244
We conducted 73 structured interviews based on a standard questionnaire with staff from 63 245 land trusts or government agencies. These structured interviews were conducted by phone (n=49), 246 in person (n=22), or through written email correspondence when this was preferred by 247 organizational staff (n=2). We asked staff involved with CEs to describe the organization's 248 approach to drafting CE language and how that approach has changed over time. We inductively 249 coded open-ended questions (Boyatzis, 1998) and identified sixteen recurring themes. 250
RESULTS 251

Complexity 252
Multiple analyses support the hypothesis of an increase in CE complexity. First, we found an 253 increase in the number of CE purposes (Fig. 1 
Restrictiveness 278
Trends in land-use restrictions differed by land-use. Waste dumping and mining were more 279 likely to be prohibited after 2000 while other land-use terms showed no significant change 280 (Table 3) . 281 CEs were more likely to allow development after 2000 (Fig. 3a) . CEs have become twice as 283 likely to allow one residence or other structures (including agricultural buildings, sheds or 284 cabins) and 2.5 times more likely to allow two or more residences than no development (odds 285 ratios in Table 4 ). 286 Timber harvest and grazing terms experienced a shift toward the middle. That is, timber 297 harvests are less likely to be prohibited and more likely to be explicitly permitted with some 298 restrictions in the CE or a management plan after 2000 (Fig. 3b ). Before 2000, 54% of forested 299
CEs did not allow harvest, compared to only 30% of forested CEs after 2000. CE terms that 300 allowed harvest with some restrictions increased from 30% of forested CEs before 2000 to 61% 301 after 2000, while terms that allowed any unrestricted harvest or were silent on harvest declined 302 from 16% before 2000 to 10% after 2000. The shift from no harvest to some harvest with 303 restrictions was significant in the multinomial logistic regression that controlled for working land 304 purpose (Appendix Table 3 ). The odds ratios indicated that CEs were 3 times more likely to 305 allow some harvest with restrictions than no harvest (1/odds ratio of 0.33=3.03) or any 306 unrestricted harvest (1/odds ratio of 0.31=3.23) after 2000. 307
Grazing terms also provided some evidence of a shift to the middle, meaning that fewer 308 properties prohibited grazing outright and fewer properties allowed it without restriction after 309 2000 ( Fig. 3c ). Before 2000, only 32% of grass/shrub CEs include some restrictions on grazing 310 in the CE or management plan, whereas 50% of those after 2000 included some restrictions. The 311 percent of CEs with no grazing restrictions declined from 61% to 39%. No grazing is allowed in 312 7% of CEs grass/shrub CEs before 2000 and 11% after 2000. Grazing terms had a marginally-313 significant shift from any harvest allowed to some harvest allowed with restrictions, once 314 property size and working land purpose were controlled for in the model (Appendix Table 4 ). 315
Perceived changes in CE terms 316
Based on inductive coding, we identified recurring themes in response to questions asking 317 whether an organization's approach to drafting CEs had changed, and if so, how and why it 318 changed ( Table 5 ). The majority of interviewees (85%) stated that the organization had changed 319 its approach to drafting. An additional two interviewees initially stated that the approach had not 320 changed, but then described changes (increasing the percent of interviewees discussing changes 321 to 88%). While most described a shift toward complexity, we also heard that some organizations 322 are starting to reign in the complexity of CEs in favor of simple, clear terms. We heard 323 conflicting views about whether recent CEs are more or less restrictive of private land uses. 324 325 "Much longer and more detailed over time, with much more professional drafting" Influence of a particular staff
15
"Documents changed based on the attorney involved."
Use of model CE 14
Organizations developed templates Less restrictive 12 "Whenever possible we get away from micromanagement type issues on the property, for instance trying to not be involved in day-to-day management type issues…." Shift in organization focus 8
The organization was more preservationist focused before, but now has more "working land easements."
Reaction to IRS or case law 8 "Due to IRS ranks becoming stricter, easements must become more sophisticated and detailed to meet the regulations." Organization looked to LTA 7 "Basically we've followed the changes in the Land Trust Alliance's approach to easement drafting." Easier to enforce or monitor 6 "[We] are using more terms that are monitorable and enforceable and trying to provide flexibility for adaptive management." Less specific 5 "The language used to be too specific" Simpler 4 Desire to make the language "clearer" and "more simple" More prohibitions 4 "… much easier to constrain an activity than it is to prescribe one." Constraints can be documented and tracked. 328 4. DISCUSSION 329
Hypothesis 1: Increasing Complexity 330
Consistent with our expectations, CEs have become more complex and detailed. Our analysis 331 of CE documents and interviews with conservation practitioners shows how CEs are increasing 332 in complexity. This increase in complexity likely has many sources, including repeat players in 333 negotiations, contingency planning, diffusion of innovation, organizational learning, and the 334 increased prominence of purchased CEs on large properties with working land uses. 335
Purposes 336
Within our sample, the number and specificity of purposes increased over time. These more 337 diverse purposes may be an effort to ensure compliance with state and federal law as parties 338 mirror the language that appears in statutes. CE purposes may also respond to judicial action. For 339 example, conservationists worry about the implications of the doctrine of changed conditions, 340 which suggests that when circumstances change the landscape such that purposes can no longer 341 be fulfilled, CEs will terminate (Jay, 2012) . Adding purposes to a CE could then serve as a indication of which might take precedence. Generally, multiple purposes can create confusion for 354 land managers (Fischman, 2002) . Purposes may become incompatible, and individual land-use 355 restrictions and permissions may conflict with one or more purposes. 356
Land-Use Terms 357
CEs since 2000 are likely to mention more land-use terms such as for dumping waste, 358 mining, and subdivision of the property. Land-use terms are likely to increase for some of the 359 same reasons as purposes. Increased litigation and scrutiny by the IRS as well as involvement by 360 other government entities like state attorneys general may also lead drafters to add language 361 clarifying rights and responsibilities. Additionally, as CEs cover larger and more varied 362
properties in more circumstances (e.g., in development schemes or in working landscapes), there 363 may be a greater need to explain permitted and prohibited land uses. 364
One of the biggest increases was in management plans, which is an intriguing phenomenon. 365
On one hand it represents an acknowledgement of both the need to accommodate change and the 366 potential need for active land management (Rissman et al., 2014) . On the other hand, 367 management plans can provide an avenue for delaying controversial decisions regarding CE 368 terms as items eluding agreement can be pushed off for consideration another day and hidden 369 from public review (Rissman et al., 2013) . 370
Procedural Clauses 371
Later CEs were more likely to contain procedural boilerplate clauses regarding Acts of God, 372 dispute resolution, and amendment. Interviews indicated that sometimes these new clauses 373 appeared when new staff members or outside attorneys began drafting the documents. This may 374 have the impact of leaving terms in subsequent CEs with individual staff members no longer 375 certain of their origin (Argote, 1999) .The largest increase was in amendment clauses, which is 376 particularly noteworthy as it accompanies a heated debate within the conservation community 377 about the role of amendments. Some have argued that perpetual agreements should not be 378 amended and this generally appears to be the view of the IRS (Bjork v. Draper (2010) ). 379
However, most conservationists acknowledge that it is unrealistic and impractical to have long-380 term agreements without mechanisms for change. The Land Trust Alliance recommends 381 including amendment clauses and having amendment policies (Alliance, 2004 ) and accreditation 382 requires it (Commission, 2014) . This trend may help explain the increased presence of dispute 383 resolution and Acts of God clauses. We may also be starting to see some backlash or course 384 correction in response to the increasing complexity of CE terms in which organizations are 385 focusing more on designing decision-making processes for settling CE disputes. 386
Hypothesis 2: Decreasing Restrictiveness 387
We hypothesized that land use terms have become less restrictive, but the trends we found 388 are more complex. Restrictions on development have declined, and CEs created after 2000 are 389 twice as likely to allow at least one or two residences than CEs before 2000. However, we found 390 a shift toward compromise for timber harvest and grazing, with a decline in complete 391 prohibitions on timber harvest and a decline in completely unrestricted grazing. Provisions 392 regarding waste dumping and mining tended to be more restrictive. The presence of a mining 393 term may be influenced by federal tax regulations requiring limitations on mining for tax-394 deductible CEs. 395
The patterns of CE evolution reflect broader trends in conservation policy and philosophy. 396 Earlier CEs were viewed as a close alternative to fee simple ownership in which some 397 landowners desired or were willing to accept limited land uses on their properties. We see 398 evidence of the shift toward conserving used landscapes and the intent to promote compatibility 399 between natural resource production and conservation (Brunson and Huntsinger, 2008; Sayre, 400 2005) . However at some level, increasing private land uses also suggests challenges for 401 preventing undue private benefit and abuse of the CE tool. Meanwhile, increasing knowledge 402 about conservation science indicates conservation benefits may be available in small slices. For 403 example, practitioners may be more confident about allowing selective cutting of a forest parcel 404 and still protecting some species habitat and water quality benefits. This has led to a shift toward 405 the middle as the parties seek to compromise on the private land uses permitted on conserved 406
properties. 407
CONCLUSION 408
CEs held a promise of being a simple low-cost alternative to fee-simple acquisition, but are 409 becoming increasingly complex. As CEs get complex we have shown that they have become 410 more restrictive for mining, waste dumping, and grazing, but less restrictive for development and 411 timber harvesting. CEs are more likely to detail what landowners can and cannot do and consider 412 more issues than they had previously. CEs are being used more often and in more contexts. 413
Where CEs cover larger land areas, they are more likely to spell out rights and obligations and 414 related to multiple land uses. We show that the question of what it means to conserve private 415 land, and what balance of private and public rights and responsibilities are being codified in 416 conservation restrictions, has changed over time. In an era of fragmented and devolved 417 governance, nonprofit organizations and governments with considerable rulemaking autonomy 418 are negotiating conservation terms. It is important to understand these choices and trends shaping 419 the private-land conservation estate. 420 421 422
